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ABSTRACT
This article calls for more understanding of the ethical challenges and
dilemmas that arise as a result of state involvement in academic
research on ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’. It suggests that researchers
and research institutions need to be more attentive to the
possibilities of co-option, compromise, conﬂict of interests and other
ethical issues. The paper empirically examines the relationship
between academic researchers and the security state. It highlights
three key ways in which ethical and professional standards in social
scientiﬁc research can be compromised: (1) Interference with the
evidence base (through a lack of transparency on data and conﬂicts
of interest); (2) Collaboration on research supporting deception by
the state which undermines the ability of citizens to participate in
democratic processes; and (3) Collaboration on research legitimating
human rights abuses, and other coercive state practices. These
issues are widespread, but neglected, across: literature on ‘terrorism’
and ‘extremism’; literature on research ethics; and, in practical
ethical safeguards and procedures within research institutions. In
order to address these issues more eﬀectively, we propose that any
assessment of research ethics must consider the broader power
relations that shape knowledge production as well as the societal
impact of research. In focusing on the centrality of states – the most
powerful actors in the ﬁeld of ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ – our
approach moves beyond the rather narrow procedural approaches
that currently predominate. We argue more attention to the power
of the state in research ethics will not only help to make visible, and
combat, ethically problematic issues, but will also help to protect
the evidence base from contamination. We conclude by proposing
a series of practical measures to address the problems highlighted.
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Introduction
The current focus in ethical discourse is mostly on protecting research subjects from
potential harm arising directly from participation in research (Hammersley & Traianou,
2012). Researching conﬂict and ‘terrorism’ poses particular challenges around accessing
research subjects and meeting standard requirements for informed consent. But there
are also distinct and broader ethical questions that arise around potential harm to research
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subjects, and indeed to other actors, including researchers themselves. Fieldwork may
pose considerable risks to researchers, both physical and psychological, whilst the politi-
cally sensitive nature of research may also carry reputational and professional risks. Harm
to research subjects, meanwhile, may arise not only from the research process itself, but
more broadly and more signiﬁcantly from powerful actors – often parties to the
conﬂicts under investigation – seeking to access, make use of, or inﬂuence/manipulate
either research ﬁndings, or how research is received, understood and used. The former
aspects bring particular challenges when it comes to conﬁdentiality and the security of
data, whilst the latter requires that the societal impact of research be carefully considered.
In either case, an understanding of social power, and the power of the state in particular, is
crucial. The power of corporations is, of course, also of relevance in such discussions (Alve-
salo-Kuusi & Whyte, 2018), although it is not the focus of this article.
The state can use legislation, judicial proceedings and executive powers to undermine
conﬁdentiality by forcing disclosure. It is, moreover, often able to control and inﬂuence the
production of social scientiﬁc knowledge in its interests. It can do this by funding, directing
and inﬂuencing research, and by restricting access to certain types of information by
blocking or interfering with publication through secrecy, censorship and direct intimida-
tion of researchers, or those that would report or distribute research ﬁndings. Such inter-
ventions potentially undermine the rigour of academic research and the integrity of social
scientiﬁc knowledge.
In this article, we focus on the ethical questions that arise as a result of state interven-
tion in social scientiﬁc research on ‘terrorism’ and political violence. We examine social
science and not, for example, STEM subjects since most research on ‘terrorism’ takes
place in the former. We look at empirical examples of existing academic and security col-
laborations to demonstrate that social power (of the state), academic freedom and knowl-
edge production processes are key to understanding the ethics of research in practice.
We argue that social scientists have a professional responsibility to protect the integrity
of scientiﬁc knowledge, as well as having public responsibilities to the wider societies of
which they are part. Our approach is informed by Michael Burawoy’s (2011) ‘Public Univer-
sity’ model, since it allows us to situate academic research in relation to broader social
forces and interests. This oﬀers a conception of social scientiﬁc research that emphasises
the great importance of both professional standards and academic freedom, whilst
oﬀering a conceptual framework able to socially situate academic practices in relation
to wider interests in society. Drawing on this model helps to undergird the call that we
make for a signiﬁcant revision of current ethical policies, guidelines and enforcement
mechanisms so as to better protect vulnerable research subjects; make unethical research
(which we argue is widespread) more visible, with the intent that it be managed down;
and provide greater protections to researchers from interests that may attempt to
smear, inhibit, constrain or undermine independent research. We conclude with proposals
for a series of practical measures. We begin ﬁrst with an examination of the legal context in
which research on political violence takes place in the US and UK.
Censorship and coercion
Linda Fuller (1988) writes extensively on the ways in which the US state has created ‘for-
bidden research terrains’. She recounts the role of the CIA in restricting research in Cuba as
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part of the US state’s strategy for isolating the country. Researchers returning from Cuba
could be subject to surveillance or harassment, and even have publications conﬁscated by
US customs (Fuller, 1988, p. 104). As Fuller (1988) and others (Lee, 1993; Tombs & Whyte,
2003; Warren & Staples, 1989) have noted, such restrictions present diﬃculties for
researchers seeking to interrogate the claims of state oﬃcials and other powerful actors,
who may ﬁnd themselves unable to carry out research with suﬃcient methodological
rigour, reinforcing the accounts of those who govern access. As a result, the overall
quality of social scientiﬁc knowledge suﬀers, since this leads not only to gaps in knowl-
edge, but also to ‘unknown, unknowns’, which together make it diﬃcult to make informed
professional judgements in the aﬀected ﬁelds.
The British state has developed a number of techniques to control information in its
own interests that potentially impact on the quality of social science. A signiﬁcant piece
of legislation here is the Oﬃcial Secrets Act 1911 (amended 1920, 1939 and 1989),
which was enacted to prevent individuals (e.g. civil servants, journalists, researchers)
from disclosing or disseminating material about government agencies. The 1989 Act
makes it an oﬀence for individuals to disclose certain classes of information received
from security and intelligence services, government contractors and civil servants. The
Act has particularly serious implications for academic researchers working with state
oﬃcials, as is sometimes the case in policy orientated ‘terrorism’ research. We illustrate
below that in the case of the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats – an
ESRC-administered research centre at the University of Lancaster, funded by intelligence
and security agencies – research funding contracts state that academics must be prepared
to sign the Oﬃcial Secrets Act 1989. It should be noted that the law does not require one
to sign the act to be bound by it. There are certain classes of information that are legally
deﬁned as Oﬃcial Secrets. Nevertheless, signing the Oﬃcial Secrets Act can oﬀer proof
that the individual is aware of the secretive status of the information.
Whilst in some circumstances respecting state secrecy may be ethically proper, it is not
diﬃcult to envisage scenarios in which it may conﬂict with a researcher’s responsibility to
society. If a researcher witnesses a miscarriage of justice or a crime, they are ethically (and
often legally) compelled to report it – and state crime is no exception. Yet if the researcher
in question has signed the Oﬃcial Secrets Act, they would be breaking the law if they were
to disclose, for example, alleged or actual abuses carried out by the security services. Most
researchers enter some form of conﬁdentiality agreement when conducting research with
human subjects, and this often covers state actors participating in research. These conﬁ-
dentiality agreements, however, can be broken within the bounds of the law in excep-
tional circumstances. In fact, the law is relatively clear that it is a legal obligation for
researchers to break conﬁdentiality if a participant discloses that they have or are about
to commit a crime (Wiles, Crow, Heath, & Charles, 2008, p. 419). There are also a set of
moral and ethical considerations a researcher must make if they are faced with a
‘heinous discovery’. While this has been debated widely with respect to moral obligations
faced by researchers in relation to child abuse, there is little discussion about the potential
issues arising in uncovering crimes of the powerful. In the case of child abuse, practitioner
guidelines related to ‘duty of care’ principles can act as a professional and ethical standard,
particularly in the case of practitioner researchers (Wiles et al., 2008, p. 419). But it is impor-
tant to consider the diﬀerent ethical and political judgments that come into play when a
researcher is ‘studying up’ (Nader, 1969; Williams, 1989). Protecting the privacy of civilians,
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political activists and other non-state actors is diﬀerent to protecting public ﬁgures and
state oﬃcials. Social scientists have, in part, a responsibility to hold oﬃcials to account,
and legislation like the Oﬃcial Secrets Act runs against this ethical duty and could place
a researcher in conﬂict with their own personal safety and security or with their responsi-
bility towards society. Lee-Treweek and Linkogle (2000) identify four types of danger that
researchers may encounter – physical, emotional, ethical and professional. The Oﬃcial
Secrets Act risks all these dangers for researchers. Academics should not be placed in
this morally and professionally compromised position. Nor should we understate the
emotional and psychological pressure of carrying state secrets. It is also worth noting
that the application of the Oﬃcial Secrets Act to academic research arguably runs
counter not only to ethical obligations, but also certain legal rights and duties. Article
10 of the Human Rights Act 1998, for example, protects ‘the freedom to hold opinions
and to receive and impart information and ideas’. Although there are limitations to the
application of the article, such restrictions need to demonstrate a pressing social need
(Feenan, 2002).
At the other end of the spectrum is forced disclosure. Under UK legislation there are
penalties for failing to disclose information about oﬀences to the police and law enforce-
ment agencies, and judicial bodies can intervene to force disclosure. Such legislation
includes provisions within anti-terrorism legislation. Dermot Feenan (2002) traces the gov-
ernment legislation and case law in UK and US which allows research to be conﬁscated,
subpoenaed or kept secret. In the US, subpoenas have targeted research related to a
variety of criminal activities (Leo, 1995). Scarce (1995), for example, was jailed for refusing
to obey a court order to release information about his participants in research on environ-
mental activism. A notable recent example is the case of the Boston College Tapes in
which two interview transcripts from an oral history with former Irish republican parami-
litaries were subpoenaed and passed on to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)
(See Breen-Smyth, this issue).
A researcher’s responsibility to protect their participants from harm is a core ethical
principle of social scientiﬁc research. In the context of researching political violence,
research material about participants can have serious consequences if they end up in
the hands of certain state institutions. For example, the home of one of Jeﬀrey Sluka’s par-
ticipants in Belfast was searched by the British Army shortly after an interview had taken
place (Sluka, 1990), whilst a more tragic example is the murder of a political activist in Peri-
tore’s (1990) study on clandestine left groups in Mexico. Researchers have gone to great
lengths to keep the identities of participants concealed, or to keep data safe (Feenan, 2002;
Peritore, 1990; Sluka, 1990). One strategy is disutilisation, which involves various forms of
self-censorship to avoid the misuse of research. Phillip Bourgois (1990), for example, con-
sidered delaying the publication of his ﬁndings on peasant politicisation in El Salvador for
fear that the CIA would use them for ‘practical counterinsurgency’. Such self-censorship
may be justiﬁed, and even necessary, to protect the reputations, livelihoods and personal
safety of participants, but it does entail a loss to scientiﬁc knowledge and therefore to
society (Adler & Adler, 1993, p. 262). The coercive state powers that make such strategies
necessary, therefore, should be subject to examination and critique.
Forced disclosure raises a number of ethical questions for ‘terrorism’ research. It under-
mines the true role of the researcher ‘to observe, to understand and to explain, perhaps as
a basis of problem-solving’ (Schwatz, 1976 cited by Feenan, 2002), essentially coercing
4 N. MASSOUMI ET AL.
researchers into cooperation or complicity with law enforcement. With respect to the issue
of informed consent, it sharpens the question of how researchers should outline the possi-
bility that their research could be subject to court orders, subpoenas and other forms of
forced disclosure when recruiting participants, as is recommended in the ESRC (2015a)
and BSA (2017) guidelines. Doing so will create great diﬃculties in gaining access to par-
ticipants, meaning that the development of social scientiﬁc knowledge about areas of con-
siderable public importance will be inhibited.
Draconian counter-terrorism legislation can, moreover, pose particular challengers for
researchers. In the UK, the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 requires universities
to pay ‘due regard’ to prevent people ‘being drawn into terrorism’. This statutory duty
has meant that universities have introduced a range of new measures to monitor research
that may involve accessing materials relating to ‘terrorism’ and political violence. The
Prevent duty guidance for higher education states that ‘we would expect to see clear pol-
icies and procedures for students and staﬀ working on sensitive or extremism-related
research’. Following this guidance, the University of Bath, for example, introduced a
new register for academics researching materials or content that may ‘support terrorism’.
This monitoring procedure, apparently there to protect staﬀ, has ethical implications. The
register is sharable with law enforcement agencies, therefore meaning that any academics
listed on this register could not guarantee to honour any conﬁdentiality agreements they
make with their research subjects. Some academic staﬀ at the University of Bath raised
concerns about this new measure, in particular given the fact that ‘supporting terrorism’
was not clearly deﬁned with the risk of misapplication. Moreover, the Terrorism Act
2006 makes possession or dissemination of ‘terrorist’ publications a criminal oﬀence. In
addition, under the Terrorism Act 2000 collecting or making ‘a record of information of
a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism’ is an
oﬀence. This legal context has implications for academic freedom and has in the past
resulted in staﬀ and student arrests (Miller, Mills, & Harkins, 2011).
Secret research
The use of the Oﬃcial Secrets Act in an academic setting or routine processes of conﬁden-
tiality and secrecy, opens up the possibility for secret or covert research. We refer under
this rubric to research conducted by or for military or intelligence agencies. While the
UK, like other states, maintains secret research laboratories such as Porton Down in the
South West of England, which has been the subject of some research (Schmidt, 2015),
we focus here on the interface of this ‘in-house’ research with civilian academics, either
in terms of secondments to oﬃcial organisations or in terms of academic research
being funded by governmental agencies. This work can be secret in the sense that it is
(1) Not openly disclosed by the funding agency or the university/academic(s) involved;
or (2) The research process itself, including the publication processes, is subject to controls,
restrictions and/or direct interference by government agencies.
Loch Johnson (1989), in his study of the CIA’s relationship with academics, argues that
there should be no place for covert research in the academy. During the Cold War, the CIA
developed relationships with academics through consultancies, scholars-in residence pro-
grammes and research contracts. However, this relationship ran into a number of conﬂicts,
partly as a result of political scrutiny and public criticisms of the CIA’s activities, but also as
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a result of student and academic pushback against encroachments into universities
(Johnson, 1989, pp. 176–180). The CIA then issued guidelines for its relations with aca-
demics that allowed classiﬁed information to be published, subject to review by the
Agency. The guidelines, however, did not oﬀer safeguards against academics being
drawn into covert research or activities (Johnson, 1989, p. 180). At the time, the CIA
required that academics in receipt of funds should not publicly acknowledge their
relationship with the agency. Scholars such as Samuel Huntington thus produced articles
in academic journals such as International Security (in 1985), which unbeknown to readers
were connected to CIA funding (Johnson, 1989). Though such deceptions are now widely
regarded as unethical, it is an open question how extensive they now are. In the next sec-
tions, we examine several examples of secret/covert research, including research spon-
sored by the UK defence establishment; research to improve government deception
activities; and a research centre funded by UK intelligence agencies in which secrecy legis-
lation is invoked as a condition of the funding. We point to the inherent dangers of this, as
well as examining consequent dangers of scholars endorsing, legitimating or enhancing
coercive or deceptive governmental activities. We focus on coercive and deceptive activi-
ties in state-sponsored research on ‘terrorism’ because both activities undermine demo-
cratic debate and decision-making; coercion by removing choice and volition, and
deception by manipulating the information environment in which citizens make political
judgements.
The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory
Defence-related research in the UK is not routinely made publicly available. The UK
defence establishment has a ‘central repository’, known as ‘Athena’, that is operated by
the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), an executive agency of the Min-
istry of Defence (MoD) created in 2001. Athena ‘stores MOD-sponsored scientiﬁc and tech-
nical research reports, which are available to the wider defence and security community
(including government, industry and academia) in accordance with security, legal and
commercial conditions’ (DSTL, 2016). ‘Wherever possible’, the agency notes, ‘we aim to
publish the results of our work in open peer-reviewed literature’. This is an indirect way
of saying that the MoD and DSTL do not routinely publish the names of the researchers
or universities they fund, nor even the titles of research. Athena does, however, publish
a bulletin called Defence Reporter that provides only ‘unclassiﬁed’ bibliographic infor-
mation of ‘research reports recently added to the Athena report collection’. An examin-
ation of these two outputs (Athena and Defence Reporter) in the context of what is
known about the social scientiﬁc and behavioural research carried out by DSTL shows
the very conditional sense in which the research base can even be known about, far
less examined and tested scientiﬁcally.
In order to appreciate the professional and ethical implications of this we need ﬁrst to
review some of what is known about the work done at DSTL, focusing especially on behav-
ioural research on ‘inﬂuence’. Work on ‘inﬂuence’, information operations and the like has
been conducted at DSTL since its creation in 2001, and was a signiﬁcant element of the
work of its predecessor agency, the Defence Evaluation Research Agency (Miller & Mills,
2010). In its 2001 Annual Report, Information Operations was listed as one of seven
areas headed by ‘Technical Capability Leaders’ reporting to the main Board, and in 2010
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it listed Information Operations as part of the capabilities of its ‘security science’ depart-
ment (Powerbase, 2013).
In 2011, the Cyber and Inﬂuence Science and Technology Centre at DSTL launched a
research call on ‘Innovative Solutions to Protect and Secure UK Interests in Cyberspace’.
One of the three themes was ‘Inﬂuence Through Cyber’, which included: cyber-
Inﬂuence, on-line / oﬀ-line behaviours, social media monitoring and analysis, cyber-ethno-
graphy or ‘netnography’, and novel approaches to dynamics of personality, leadership,
trust and emotion in on-line settings (CDE & DSTL, 2011). More recently the involvement
of DSTL in research on social media has attracted press commentary:
The MoD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) pays six-ﬁgure sums to support
individual PhD students to help understand the rapidly evolving world of cyberspace and the
way in which social media have become an integral part of daily life.
While some of the PhD projects in the £10 m programme have conventional military appli-
cations – such as researching technology to support underwater drones, and the development
of clothing with fully embedded electronics – £97,487 of funding for research at King’s College
London into ‘the rise of the digital insurgency’ is typical of the new direction. (Quinn, 2014,
January 7)
We have highlighted this strand of the work since there are strong ethical issues
involved in social scientists’ engagement with government communications and
‘inﬂuence’ work, but also to examine the extent to which the outcomes of this research
is publicised, or even acknowledged, by government.
Going back to the two publications of Athena, the ﬁrst is a list of published outputs
funded by DSTL. The latest available lists 370 publications covering the period from 2011
to 2016 (DSTL, 2016). In the main, these are publications from the natural sciences
(physics, chemistry, biology and their subﬁelds) and engineering (and its subﬁelds).
There are more than 40 journals with the word ‘science’ in the title, more than 30 in
journals with the word ‘microbiology’ in the title and more than 20 in journals with
either ‘engineering’ or ‘chemistry/chemical’ in the title. There are no articles in sociology
or political science journals. There are three in journals with ‘psych’ in the title and one
article on ‘horizon scanning’ in public policy. None of these articles were on inﬂuence or
behavioural research. There was one on information operations, which did not report
any ﬁndings, being simply a review article (Verrall & Clay, 2016). In other words, there
is little disclosure on the public record by DSTL of its signiﬁcant work on propaganda
and ‘inﬂuence’. DSTL involvement in research in this area is a matter of public record,
but neither the scope nor the details of the particular projects are available from the
agency, or indeed in any easily accessible way from the CV’s or university repositories
of the researchers involved.
The Athena database of research reports is distributed in two ways. As noted above,
there is the Defence Reporter, which provides unclassiﬁed bibliographic information of
research reports recently added to the database. Then there is a ‘classiﬁed’ email alert,
which is only available to ‘people who have access to MOD’s intranet’. In addition, the
full text of reports listed in the Athena database can be requested ‘by completing a
“Need to know” form for UK Nationals’ or a ‘“Need to know” form for Foreign Nationals’.
Release of the reports is governed by a four part classiﬁcation system. Unclassiﬁed docu-
ments are releasable to an unlimited audience, whereas with ‘protectively marked’ reports,
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the ‘Report Request Team’ will ‘release the report if the requester has appropriate security
clearance’. Among those noted as potentially receiving such reports are ‘industry’ and ‘aca-
demia’. The other two categories are for classiﬁed documents which may be ‘only releasa-
ble to MoD or government’ or which have ‘no/ambiguous’ release statement. In both
cases, the team will ‘contact the individual responsible for the report’s release’. The
report ‘will only be released if that individual approves’ (MOD & DSTL, 2016).
The problem with such secret research is that it cannot be properly tested by others
since none of the data from the research is available. In addition, given this secrecy it is
not always clear what material role has been played by the funding body in study
design, data collection and analysis, or in the production of publications.
In what follows, we provide another example of secret defence-related research that
highlights the involvement of social scientists in activities involving deception. We
argue that this is problematic since it undermines the democratic principle of informed
consent of citizens who may be misled by deceptive information emanating from
government.
JTRIG and covert manipulation and propaganda
A series of documents provided by GCHQ to the NSA as part of the ‘Five Eyes Alliance’ of
Anglophone intelligence agencies revealed the existence of a hitherto secret British pro-
paganda unit called the Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group (JTRIG), operating within
GCHQ with a staﬀ of 150+ in 2013 (GCHQ, 2014). According to the documents, ‘which
come from presentations prepped in 2010 and 2012 for NSA cyber spy conferences, the
agency’s goal was to “destroy, deny, degrade [and] disrupt” enemies by “discrediting”
them, planting misinformation and shutting down their communications’ (Cole, Mark
Schone, & Greenwald, 2014). The documents describe ‘Eﬀects’ campaigns that are
broadly divided into two categories: cyber attacks and propaganda operations. The propa-
ganda campaigns use deception, mass messaging and ‘pushing stories’ via Twitter, Flickr,
Facebook and YouTube. JTRIG also uses ‘false ﬂag’ operations, in which British agents carry
out online actions that are designed to look like they were performed by one of Britain’s adver-
saries. (Cole et al., 2014)
As journalist Glenn Greenwald (2014) has noted, the documents show that JTRIG adopts
two main tactics: ‘(1) to inject all sorts of false material onto the internet in order to destroy
the reputation of its targets; and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques to manip-
ulate online discourse and activism to generate outcomes it considers desirable’. The
documents also make it clear that the target of such tactics are not just ‘terrorists’ or
hostile foreign powers, but also political activists and those not charged with any crime
or oﬀence. The documents also show that the agency was working with a bewildering
variety of government departments in the UK, including on issues such as radicalisation
with the Department for Children, Schools and Families.
One key document giving the most detailed account of the activities of JTRIG was pro-
duced in 2011 by a psychologist, Mandeep Dhami, who worked at DSTL for ﬁfteen
months, including a period on secondment to GCHQ. In the document, (Dhami, 2011a,
2011b), who at the time also worked at the University of Cambridge, provided JTRIG
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with advice to help improve the unit’s performance and eﬀectiveness. The paper,
Fishman (2015) writes:
notes that the unit’s own staﬀ characterize their work using ‘terms such as “discredit”, promote
“distrust,” “dissuade,” “deceive,” “disrupt,” “delay,” “deny,” “denigrate/degrade,” and “deter”.’
The unit’s targets go beyond terrorists and foreign militaries and include groups considered
‘domestic extremist[s],’ criminals, online ‘hacktivists,’ and even ‘entire countries’.
Some psychologists raised questions about involvement in this work, not only in
relation to research subjects or in terms of openness and honesty in reporting ﬁndings,
but in terms of the ethical issues in facilitating deceptive and manipulative activities by
government (Fishman, 2015).
It can, of course, be argued that deception and inﬂuence activities by government are
the lesser evil when placed beside the coercive ‘kinetic’ activities of western military
power, such as torture and killing. Indeed, Dhami (2011b) has made this argument herself:
The harm that may be caused by remaining detached from such campaigns, perhaps because
of the element of deception and invasion of privacy involved, may far outweigh the beneﬁts of
striving for the welfare and rights of the campaign targets. Indeed, the perceived success of
military social inﬂuence may reduce the requirement for the use of kinetic force. As stake-
holders, it is our obligation to monitor the application of our science in order to minimize
or avoid the above risks.
The conditional ‘may’, used twice, when set beside the absence of any evidence of ben-
evolent eﬀect, is instructive. Given this, and the fact that the work Dhami did at DSTL had
applications outside military conﬂict in peace time and domestic politics, there is arguably
a question of potential violations of the principles of the British Psychological Society, in
which psychologists are enjoined to ‘support beneﬁcial outcomes… that not only
support and reﬂect respect for the dignity and integrity of persons (both individually and
collectively) but also contribute to the “common good”’ (BPS, 2014, p. 11). Psychologists
are also told they ‘should consider all research from the standpoint of the research partici-
pants, and any other persons, groups or communities who may be potentially aﬀected by
the research, with the aim of avoiding potential risks to psychological well-being, mental
health, personal values, the invasion of privacy or dignity’ (BPS, 2014, p. 11). The argument
madebyDhami is essentially that researchers should engage in potentially harmful research
in the hope that greater harms might thereby be averted. This is undergirded by the wildly
improbable belief that academic researchers are in a position to eﬀectively ‘monitor the
application’ of research by defence or intelligence agencies.
The questions of transparency, and possibly deception, are underscored here by
the fact that the journal in which this article (Dhami, 2011b) appeared is a member
of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE & OASPA, 2017), which in 2011, man-
dated that journals should publish ‘relevant competing interests for all contributors
and publishing corrections if competing interests are revealed after publication’
(COPE, 2011, p. 3).
Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST)
Another major hub for security collaborations in UK academia is the Centre for Research
and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), based at the University of Lancaster. CREST
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was set up following a public call for proposals from the Economic and Social Research
Council for a research hub aimed at ‘understanding, countering and mitigating security
threats’ (ESRC, 2015b). Up to £5 million was oﬀered to the successful proposal, but unu-
sually the money came not from ESRC funds but directly from the ‘UK security and intelli-
gence agencies’.
Prior to the public call, the ESRC had run an invite only meeting in central London in
January 2015 to consult on the initiative – at which one of the authors (DM) was
present.1 One outcome of that meeting was that the initial plans to have the intelligence
agencies contract directly with the winning university were shelved, with the ESRC instead
formally contracted with the winning team. An early indication at the meeting of the ethi-
cally murky waters in which such initiatives swim was the attendance list. While giving the
institutional aﬃliations of all the academics present, it also listed several people for whom
no aﬃliations were given, and in some cases only a ﬁrst name and initial of the surname
were given. After a number of queries (from DM) it was conﬁrmed by a government oﬃcial
present that the attendees without aﬃliations (or surnames) were all serving intelligence
operatives. Among the suggestions given at the meeting for embedding intelligence per-
sonnel in the initiative was the secondment of operatives into universities, which one of
the intelligence personnel present suggested might be covert. It is the fact that these
agencies are engaged in covert action, and operate under a veil of secrecy, that makes
it diﬃcult to ascertain whether or not such arrangements have since come to pass.
The ‘contract award letter conditions’ (CREST, 2015) set out the terms and conditions of
the award including details of publishing rules and relationship with the research sponsor
(s). It also states that researchers may be required to sign the Oﬃcial Secrets Act, referring
to the main recipient of the award as ‘the hub’.
The Hub is expected to cooperate with UK Security and Intelligence Agencies in making
appropriate security arrangements for any work involving classiﬁed information. In the
event that classiﬁed information is involved in any work done by the Hub, the Hub under-
stands and acknowledges that special arrangements will be agreed directly with the UK Secur-
ity and Intelligence Agency concerned to ensure that the information is properly safeguarded.
If the work of the Hub, or any of the Academic Partners, requires them to have access to sen-
sitive or conﬁdential information, core staﬀmay be required to sign the Oﬃcial Secrets Act and
a conﬁdentiality agreement, and may be asked to apply for security clearance.
We have explained above the various ethical problems arising from academics signing
the Oﬃcial Secrets Act. In addition, the letter states that all CREST funded publications are
subject to review by the Security and Intelligence Agencies’ nominated contact ‘prior to
their submission for publication’. Academics are asked to ‘make amendments’ if it is
decided they breach the Oﬃcial Secrets Act, any conﬁdentiality agreement, or are
deemed to have a ‘detrimental impact to national security’. Academics ‘will not proceed
with the publication unless and until Agencies’ nominated point of contact conﬁrms
that its concerns have been addressed’.
This process seems quite likely to mean that CREST sponsored research publications will
have key omissions in data, analysis or argumentation. It could be argued that these risks
can be mitigated by full disclosure of any such issues in CREST related publication. To
evaluate this perspective we examined all the ‘journal’ publications from CREST from its
foundation in 2015 until late 2018, as claimed and listed in its September 2018 Catalogue
(CREST, 2018). We looked for evidence of disclosure of the ultimate main funding source,
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conﬂict of interest declarations, author contribution disclosures and whether the journal in
question was a member of the committee on Publication Ethics, which mandates such dis-
closures in all member journals. Of the 31 articles, we were able to access 27. None of them
admitted to having even a potential conﬂict of interest, with only a handful (ﬁve) giving
any statement at all, which in every case was that there was variously no ‘potential’, ‘com-
peting’ or actual conﬂict of interest. In biographical aﬃliations, despite the articles all being
promoted by CREST as related to their activities, only seven mentioned CREST. To be fair,
twelve of the papers noted a source of funding. However, eleven speciﬁed that the funder
was the ESRC, which is less that a full disclosure. None mentioned that the funding came
from the security and intelligence agencies. Though ﬁve of the articles mentioned the role
of the various authors in the preparation of the manuscript, the other 22 did not and none
of the 27 mentioned the interesting role that the intelligence agencies reportedly play in
the vetting of manuscripts prior to publication. We should note that there were two
articles in which the fact that CREST was funded by intelligence agencies was mentioned
in biographical notes, as opposed to in a conﬂict of interest disclosure.
This pattern of omission and obfuscation is dishonest and contrary to the polices of the
Committee of Publication Ethics of which almost all the journals concerned are members.
All of this undermines the process of review and evaluation central to a rigorous academic
process as well as contaminating the evidence base, since there are no means to deter-
mine what covert inﬂuence there has been on the published contents and the casual
reader would not be aware of the role of the intelligence agencies in the funding and
review of the manuscripts.
The letter of award also stipulates that: since the UK Security and Intelligence Agencies
are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act that ‘the exemption will apply to any
information (including Conﬁdential Information) disclosed by the Agencies to the Hub’.
The Hub is required to agree ‘that it will not respond directly… but will inform Agencies’
… and will comply with any reasonable instructions’ from the Agencies’ in responding to
any such disclosure request.
These provisions, like secret research, compromise the whole academic community by
producing a ‘biased universe of research ﬁndings with little chance of assessing either the
direction or the extent of such bias’ (Lee, 1995, p. 35). As Adler and Adler (1993) have
argued: ‘The community of scholars loses when we are duped, deceived or misled by
the transformation or omission of relevant data’ (Adler & Adler, 1993). It also hinders meth-
odological openness. The absence of methodological detail undermines prospects for
further research in the area, or the ability to make evaluations on the existing research
ﬁndings. Such diﬃculties are exacerbated by failures to properly disclose funding from
the intelligence agencies in publications and a structural lack of clarity on the extent to
which research ﬁndings have been managed or manipulated by the state.
The American Psychological Association and the CIA torture scandal
The example of the involvement of the American Psychological Association (APA) in the
development and implementation of the CIA enhanced interrogation programme
reminds us of the ethical issues raised by collaboration with state agencies engaged in
coercive activities. The example demonstrates the role of a professional association
ethics team in covering up human rights abuses carried out by psychologists working
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for the CIA. In December 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee published a 499 page
executive summary of the Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention
and Interrogation Program. While the full 6,000-page report remains classiﬁed and the
executive summary is highly redacted, the latter does provide extraordinary detail of
the inhumane conditions in which detainees were held and the abuse to which they
were subjected. US Department of Justice memos to the CIA stated that, providing
there was no intention to cause pain, ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading’ treatment did not
constitute torture. However, the report also shows that even these approved techniques
were used in unapproved ways, such as drowning to the point of unconsciousness. It
also documents a range of other torture techniques used such as mock executions and
burials, forced feeding through the rectum, and the use of ice baths to induce hypother-
mia (The Rendition Project, 2015).
The scandal began in the aftermath of September 11th when CIA director of behav-
ioural research and APA member, Kirk Hubbard, commissioned two ex-military psycholo-
gists, James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen, to deliver a report on ‘countermeasures to al-Qaeda
resistance to interrogation techniques’. Drawing on their experience in Survival, Evasion
and Resistance (SERE) – techniques used to train US special forces to endure harsh con-
ditions of captivity – they produced a report which reverse engineered SERE principles
as the basis of the CIA ‘enhanced interrogation’ programme. Their report relied on an argu-
ably erroneous interpretation of Martin Seligman’s research on fear conditioning – a
project that involved shocking dogs into a ‘learned helplessness’. Mitchell and Jessen pro-
posed that a model of ‘learned helplessness’ could be used to induce detainees to co-
operate and provide useful intelligence. These so-called enhanced interrogation tech-
niques involved waterboarding (near drowning), sleep deprivation, stress positions and
conﬁnement in small boxes.
The APA response to this was, as a later independent report (Hoﬀman, 2015) showed, to
collaborate secretly with the Department of Defense and others to facilitate the involve-
ment of psychologists in torture. First Stephen Behnke – the APA ethics chief – relaxed
APA ethics rules in 2002, allowing psychologists to rely on the Nuremburg defence, that
they were only following orders: ‘If psychologists’ ethical responsibilities conﬂict with
law, regulations, or other governing legal authority, psychologists make known their com-
mitment to the Ethics Code and take steps to resolve the conﬂict. If the conﬂict is unresol-
vable via such means, psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the law,
regulations, or other governing authority’ (cited in APA, 2017).
The Red Cross’s ﬁrst reports of torture in CIA facilities in February 2005 led to the cre-
ation of Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS), established by
the APA’s Board of Directors. Six of the ten members of the Task Force had links with intel-
ligence or defense (Risen, 2014, p. 64) It issued a statement, which was then adopted as
policy in June 2005. This allowed psychologists ‘to serve in consultative roles to interrog-
ation- or information-gathering processes for national security-related purposes’ (Ameri-
can Psychological Association, 2005). This ‘entails a delicate balance of ethical
considerations’, but ‘puts psychologists in a unique position to assist in ensuring that
such processes are safe and ethical for all participants’ (American Psychological Associ-
ation, 2005). In 2015, the independent investigation, led by the lawyer David Hoﬀman
examined this issue, focusing in particular on the circumstances of the PENS Task force
meeting that led to the policy adopted by the APA in June 2005. Hoﬀmann concluded
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that in 2005 the Pentagon secretly colluded with key members of the APA to issue ethical
guidelines that would allow psychologists to continue to engage in harsh and abusive
interrogation techniques.
In this example too, those involved in working with the state were keen to use the lesser
evil argument. Mitchell justiﬁed the torture he had facilitated by arguing: ‘It’s a lot more
humane, even if you are going to subject them to harsh techniques, to question them
while they are still alive, than it is to kill them and their children and their neighbors
with a drone’ (Associated Press and Dilanian, 2014).
Such views may be sincerely held, but in the realpolitik of torture, as James Risen, who
ﬁrst exposed the role of the APA noted, ‘the involvement of health professionals…
enabled the Justice Department to argue in secret opinions that the program was legal
and did not constitute torture, since the interrogations were being monitored by health
professionals to make sure they were safe’ (Risen, 2015).
Although Mitchell and Jessen were psychologists working for the CIA and not an aca-
demic institution, the APA scandal raises an important issue. Here we saw a disciplinary
organisation – with leadership capacity and inﬂuence over university practices – playing
a key role in covering up human rights abuses.
CREST and lessons to be learned from the APA scandal
One of CREST’s ﬁve main research programmes is ‘eliciting information’. This is also the
theme of the ﬁrst edition of CREST’s magazine, the CREST Security Review (CSR), which
focuses on how social science can contribute to encouraging people to provide useful
information in interrogation settings. Given the sensitivity of academics facilitating military
or intelligence interrogations, especially in the context of the APA scandal, one would
expect any academic publication addressing this issue to include at least some discussion
of ethics. Yet there is no mention of ethical issues at all. Nor is there any acknowledgement
of the substantial body of evidence that demonstrates the involvement of British security
and intelligence agencies in torture, and in particular their role in the CIA’s Rendition,
Detention and Interrogation (Jardini, 2013) programme. This evidence suggests both
direct and indirect involvement in torture. Indirect involvement has included facilitating
rendition (by oﬀering direct support for capture and transfer to secret locations); enabling
torture in interrogation (by providing intelligence used in interrogations as well as sending
questions to the CIA to be used in interrogations); using information derived from torture
in interrogations; or participating in the interrogations, yet leaving the room while torture
occurs, then returning to ask a question (Blakeley & Raphael, 2017; Cobain, 2013).
In fact, there is only one mention of ‘enhanced interrogation’ in the whole issue of Crest
Security Review 1, when CREST director Paul Taylor (2016) makes the case for ‘The Promise
of Social Science’ in providing answers to security challenges, and in particular helping to
move beyond traditional methods of ‘enhanced interrogation’. The issue also includes an
article written by Dr. Robert A. Fein (2016) – one of the six members of the PENS taskforce
who had links to military and intelligence and who helped facilitate the APA in covering up
their role in CIA torture. This salient fact is not mentioned.
Ethical issues surrounding interrogation in national security and military situations
should not be treated lightly. But the secrecy surrounding research at CREST raises
further concerns. Without full knowledge of the nature of research taking place there,
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE 13
and the application of techniques developed in their ‘eliciting information’ programme, it
becomes diﬃcult to assess whether research is complying with appropriate ethical stan-
dards. In the UK, the British Psychological Society (BPS) (British Pychological Society,
2005) issued a declaration against torture in 2005. Following the US Senate report on
torture it issued a further statement which referred back to the 2005 declaration and
added a passage not in the original on ‘the overriding ethical responsibility of all psychol-
ogists and other healthcare professionals to protect and defend fundamental human
rights’ (BPS, 2014). The BPS has not issued any further statement reﬂecting on the
ethical issues posed by the 2015 Hoﬀman report to clarify their ethical stance on the
issue of psychologists facilitating military or intelligence interrogations. One lesson that
can be learned from the APA torture scandal in light of the Hoﬀman report is that
ethical codes need absolute clarity on what sorts of actions are not permissible, as well
subsequent sanctions that could follow if such ethics codes are broken. Following the
scandal, the APA revised their statement (2013; amended 2015) to address this, including
an important statement on how to deal with the issue of ethics when this conﬂicted with
the law. Rather than allow a ‘Nuremberg defence’, the statement declares that:
If the APA Ethics Code establishes a higher standard of conduct than is required by law, psy-
chologists must meet the higher ethical standard. If psychologists’ ethical responsibilities
conﬂict with law, regulations or other governing legal authority or organizational demands,
psychologists make known their commitment to this Ethics Code, and take reasonable
steps to resolve the conﬂict in a responsible manner in keeping with basic principles of
human rights. (American Psychological Association, 2015)
This standard oﬀers a useful model for the ethical dilemmas emerging in the ﬁeld of
research on ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’. We discuss in more detail ways in which such prin-
ciples could be followed and practiced in the ﬁnal section.
Recommendations
Fuller (1988) argues that in order to address the issues of access and secrecy, a collective
response is needed to address the issue of ‘forbidden research terrains’. In the following
discussion, we outline a series of principles and practices that we believe would help
strengthen ethical procedures and safeguards in the ﬁeld of political violence and
‘terrorism’.
As Adam Hedgecoe (2016) has pointed out, UK university Research Ethics Committees
(RECs) are limited in their capacity to deal with research dilemmas surrounding ‘contro-
versial issues’. Hedgecoe (2016) argues, with reference to examples from the University of
Nottingham and Bath Spa, that these committees are increasingly being used by man-
agement as ‘mechanisms for internal discipline’ (Hedgecoe, 2016, p. 486) and tend to
prioritise the reputational protection of the university rather than researchers, and
to neglect the defence of academic freedom. He argues that in this context academics
may therefore tend to shy away from controversial research that may ‘embarrass the
institution’ (Hedgecoe, 2016, p. 495). We think he makes a valid point, although recog-
nise that more research is needed to establish the ways in which Research Ethics Com-
mittees deal with ‘controversial’ topics and how they relate to internal discipline
procedures. We certainly agree with his overall argument that instead of narrowly
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focusing on institutional reputational protection, RECs need to take more seriously the
protection of researchers, especially those studying powerful groups. Though there is
very little guidance on this from the professional associations or the research councils,
as noted above there are multiple dangers encountered by researchers – including phys-
ical, emotional, reputational/professional and ethical – that arise when researching the
actions of powerful groups in situations related to political violence (Sluka, 2012,
2018). Such dangers, as we have outlined here, can include pressures to amend or
edit work (Hutcheon, 2015; Sluka, 2012), as well as legal interventions by the state auth-
orities or law enforcement agencies. Too often, the analysis of researcher safety neglects
to address the fact that it is often the authorities rather than research participants that
can pose the greatest threat. The case of the ESRC study on the Irish dissidents (dis-
cussed by Hayes in this issue) demonstrates the reputational and professional damage
that can result from involvement in unethical research. In this case two of the researchers
(Kevin Bean and Marissa McGlinchey) were unaware of the compromises being made by
the project’s principal investigator, yet their reputations were put at stake, creating
potential diﬃculties for them to carry out further research in the ﬁeld.
In order to avoid a narrow focus on institutional reputational management, Hedgecoe
proposes that university management (e.g. Deans, Pro Vice Chancellors) should have no
roles within the RECs. We would add that such committees, as well as professional
codes of ethics, should be updated to address a much wider range of ethical concerns.
These would need to include issues of publication, research sponsorship and censorship;
including how to navigate legal issues of conﬁdentiality, forced disclosure, copyright,
secrecy and academic freedom. In order to protect public trust in academic research,
we also need to consider ethical principles to manage potential conﬂicts of interest
arising from research sponsorships and funding. Any research collaboration with the
security state would have to be subject to particularly stringent safeguards. In some
cases RECs should oﬀer researchers access to independent legal advice in the research
design stage of the research process. In the case of the Boston College Tapes ﬁasco,
Palys and Lowman (2012) have argued that legal advice prior to the design of the study
may have helped researchers to resist forced disclosure and enabled them to protect par-
ticipant conﬁdentiality.
RECs, of course, have to operate under draconian counter-terrorism laws. Yet at the
same time, universities have a set of other legal duties that can oﬀer a framework of
rights and protections (such as the case of academic freedom in Education Reform Act
1988 and Human Rights Act 1998). Such a framework of rights should be made more
central to the focus of RECs. As Burawoy (2011) argues, the survival of the university
depends on reﬂexive knowledge, which requires a ‘collective conscience’ to ‘counter
the policy deﬁnitions of knowledge and elaborate the longer term interests of building
the society in the university and the university in society’ (Burawoy, 2011) This would
require greater transparency and some level of democratisation of ethics committees –
giving academic staﬀ beyond those involved in institutional committees input and over-
sight over policies and decision-making. This could be facilitated by creating requirements
for at least some members of RECs to be elected and for trade union representation to be
added to the committees. This in turn might encourage campus trade unions to become
more involved in these issues.
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Conclusion
To conclude, we have shown the importance of scrutinising the role of the state in order to
gain a fuller understanding of the range of ethical dilemmas that arise in the ﬁeld of ‘ter-
rorism’ research. State interventions in this ﬁeld of research present challenges, sometimes
even legal ones, that require us to think about ethical questions in broader terms than
current practice dictates. This may mean, in some cases, as the APA torture scandal has
shown, that our ethical guidelines need to operate at a higher standard than the law,
guided at all times by core principles of academic freedom and human rights. Yet as we
have shown in this article, the independence of academic research, from an ethical point
of view, is not only a question of morality and justice, but it is essential to maintain aca-
demic autonomy in order to protect the scientiﬁc integrity and evidence base of research.
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